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Worm in the Apple
German Traitors and Other Influences
That Pushed the World Into War:

The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf Hitler's Germany

Friedrich Lenz


15. A few words to General Halder

Since every German is probably aware of how great an importance the enemy powers must have attached to the fact that the plot against Hitler was led by persons holding such important positions of power as Beck and Halder (Chiefs of Army General Staff), Canaris (Chief of Military Intelligence), the other Generals, Herr Schacht, Herr Weizsäcker and Kordt (important functionaries with the Foreign Office), I must deal with this problem in greater detail, especially since Herr Halder Halder is presently trying to trivialize or to justify his participation in the attempts at a coup. In issue I/8 of Nation Europa, the Englishman Mr. M. T. Pacey, who had become suspicious of this entire matter, asked Herrn Halder:

    "1. Is it true, General Halder, that in September 1938 you sent a Brigadier General by the name of H. W. Boehm-Tettelbach to London in order to persuade the British government to take military steps against Hitler's successful anti-Versailles policies?

    2. Is it true that this German General was under orders to promise an attempt on the German Head of State's life 'on the day following the outbreak of war'?

    3. Is it true, General Halder, that you were informed in 1939 that your offer of such an attempt would persuade the British and Polish governments to hold the more rigidly to the Treaty of Versailles in their opposition to the German demands for territorial revision (Danzig, passage through the Corridor)?

    4. Is it true that in 1941, prior to the start of the German campaign against Russia, my country's government had the Vatican deliver a secret document to you, requesting reconfirmation of your promise of September 1938, ie. the assassination of Hitler?

    5. Is it true that in return for Hitler's removal this nation's government promised a guarantee for the following developments which had by then already taken place on the political scene abroad: full sovereignty in the Rhineland and the Saar, rearming of Germany, full equality of rights, annexation of Austria, annexation of the Sudetenland, economic assimilation (but not a political protectorate) of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia, sovereignty for Slovakia, the return of Danzig, the return of West Prussia and the easternmost part of Pomerania (after plebiscite under international supervision!), return of the Memelland?

    6. Is it true, General Halder, that you submitted this document to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, but that he rejected negotiations about the elimination of the German Head of State as constituting treason?"

On September 7, 1951, Halder replied (published in issue II/6 of Nation Europa):

    "Dear Mr. M. T. Pacey!

    "The publisher of the periodical Nation Europa has conveyed to me your inquiry which appeared under the title 'Verhängnisvolle Versprechen?' ['Fateful Promises?' -trans.]. I have the honor of answering your questions as follows:

    Re. 1. It is true that Herr Hans Boehm-Tettelbach, who, incidentally, was not a Brigadier General but a retired Lieutenant Colonel and the head of an industrial enterprise in the Rhineland, traveled to London in early September 1938 on behalf of the military opposition. As regards his 'orders', he himself stated in the July 10, 1948 issue of the Rheinische Post: 'My orders were to request key members of the British Foreign Office to ensure the British government's rigid opposition to Hitler's demands. My principals wanted nothing more than the British government's decided 'no' to Hitler's expansionist endeavors. These were the orders on which I went to London on September 1 or 2, 1938 - I don't remember the exact date.'

    "There was no mention of 'military steps' to be taken by Britain. Hitler's term 'anti-Versailles' was never used. The efforts of the military opposition were directed at only one aim, namely the prevention of a German attack on the Czechs, which must trigger a world war. For that reason, and for that reason alone, a British stance in support of these efforts was desired. Such a stance was also requested by the military opposition after previous steps had already been taken by the diplomatic opposition and, if Raymond Lacoste's remarks in La Libre Belgique of June 19, 1951 are correct, by Canaris as well.

    "Re. 2. No, Herr Boehm-Tettelbach did not have any such orders, nor did he make such a promise. In this context I wish to add that the military opposition did not at that time plan to murder Hitler. Rather, the plans and preparations made by the military opposition aimed at having Hitler arrested and tried in a German court.

    "Re. 3. No.

    "Re. 4. - 6. This probably refers to the records of negotiations carried on by a British authority with leading individuals of the German civilian opposition, with the mediation of the Vatican. The records that were brought to my attention were an unsigned copy of the results of negotiations already concluded, of which I had had no knowledge up to that time. It was my duty to submit them to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, my immediate superior. He in turn flatly refused to concern himself with this matter which, in light of the state of war between Britain and Germany, he deemed to be outright treason.

    "I am not able to give any details of that document, which was forwarded confidentially to Army Supreme Command. Herr Dr. Josef Müller, presently the Bavarian Minister of Justice, Gedeonstr. 4, Munich, who was a leading figure in the negotiations in Rome, will be able to provide such details. He will confirm that I had not the slightest part in these negotiations."

This begs the following comments:29

The term 'military opposition' in and of itself is a concept that makes any decent soldier's hair stand on end when he considers the rebellion, corruption and insubordination it entails. How much worse, then, is the 'military opposition' of a Chief of General Staff when it means that he calls on a foreign nation to assist him against his superior, to whom he has sworn loyalty and who is the leader chosen by his own nation? At Halder's trial at the Denazification Court, his own defense counsel correctly termed this "consummate high treason."

For the sake of completeness I will quote Admiral Hermann Böhm's thoughts on this attempted coup, as published in issue II/4 of Nation Europa:

"If men of high rank were convinced of Hitler's harmfulness as early as autumn 1938, and if an especially prominent one among them had already raised his hand to strike Hitler down, only to draw back on learning of the Munich Agreement and then to remain at his post under the dictator's rule for four more years of both peace and war, as other conspirators did as well, then such a course of action is quite incomprehensible....

"But if the issue is historical guilt, then a study that lays claim to historical significance must also consider whether the step of secretly urging Britain to resistance against Hitler in autumn 1938 did not perhaps contribute substantially to inducing Britain to declare war on Germany one year later, since it knew how great a rift destabilized the foundation of the German armed forces. The reference to the British guarantee to Poland will not hold water, since on September 17, 1939 Russia also entered the war that resulted in the partition of Poland - without a British declaration of war."

But since, of course, Hitler's only purpose in building up the German armed forces was to invade peaceful nations, he was a criminal, or, to use the term coined by a present-day court, the leader of a "state based on injustice", towards which it was impossible to act in a treasonous way; in other words, towards which such actions were permissible and even a duty. - That is what you mean to say, isn't it, Herr Halder?! Just a minute! We haven't come quite that far yet. Let's stay with the military aspect a little longer. I might remind you of what our superiors once said to us soldiers when we had dared to come to conclusions of our own - which, presumably, might also be one of the prerequisites for military opposition-: "Leave thinking up to the horses, they have bigger heads than you do." Being merely a former private first class, I cannot do this, but I can remind you of what Hindenburg once said to Herrn von Hammerstein when the latter advanced his plans for a coup against Hitler's Reich Chancellery: "You'd better worry instead about making sure that next year's maneuvers work better; that's your job." Under the rules of Prussian-German army tradition, tried and proven for several centuries, this was his right, and after Hitler had become Supreme Commander he doubtless had the same right as well.

He made use of this right when he said to your predecessor: "The Wehrmacht is a political tool. I will assign the army its task when the time has come to do so. The army has the duty to carry out its task, not to debate whether the task was correctly stated or not."

This was too much for Herrn Beck to take from a "Bohemian private" and hence, to quote Beck's biographer, "the soldier deliberately intervened in a field outside his own authority: the foreign affairs of the Reich! In Prussian-German tradition such intervention seemed inadmissible. Moltke and Schlieffen, even when their views differed from those of the statesman in charge, strictly refrained from stating their opinion unasked, much less presumed to influence the course of foreign affairs."

With respect to Hitler, of course, such intervention was permissible, since first of all he did not have the slightest understanding of politics and, secondly, had nothing better in mind than to attack other nations and to foolishly involve his own in a war. This process already began in the occupation of the Rhineland where, according to some 'historian' or other, Hitler allegedly already said that now he had no more territorial claims to make in Europe. Then came the 'unprovoked' attack on Austria, against which Herr Beck believed he was obliged to write no end of warning memos. He must have looked pretty stupid when he learned in the afternoon of March 10 that the planned war would really begin in two days' time, and without his contribution! He just simply had rotten luck, for Hitler had not ordered any strategic plans from the Chief of General Staff for this "war of flowers". He had, however, ordered strategic plans from the General Staff for eventualities, since after all it is the case not only in Germany but in the entire rest of the peaceful world that General Staffs do not pass the time up until the outbreak of the defensive wars they find thrust upon them with playing bridge or with other innocent pursuits. But since that bellicose Hitler - in my opinion also for reasons of having these gentlemen do something to earn their pay, and to keep in practice - had ordered strategic plans to be worked out, including one for the Czech region, he no doubt intended to engage in another war, which in turn had to be prevented, this time with your help, Herr Halder, and that of the British. That was Coup Number One. But this war once again turned out to be a "war of flowers" and netted the Reich the Sudetenland, won on the 'battlefield' of Munich. - Herr Beck himself had to admit in his memo of May 28, 1938: "It is true that Czechoslovakia, the way in which the Dictate of Versailles had forcibly set it up, is a thing not to be borne by Germany, and a way - war, if necessary - must be found to eliminate it as a danger area for Germany; only, if armed conflict were to be the way, the results must be worth it," and you, Herr Halder, saw yourself compelled to admit in the course of your interrogation at Nuremberg that Hitler had told you that he would get Czechoslovakia without any war (and did, after all, really get it, despite all memos and the attempted coup); yet the traitorous rebels nevertheless persisted in betraying your Head of State's new plans to London and begged there for unwavering opposition - alternately painting the picture blacker than black when it suited them to do so until it might have frightened the British out of their wits, and alternately downplaying the German strength as though it would be child's play to intervene.

But these important strategic messages were not enough - oh no, something had to be promised to the enemy as well, and this something was no less than the elimination of the German Head of State.

However, what you meant by 'elimination' then and what you claim today to have meant by it are two very different things, aren't they? According to the literature on this subject, you proposed the creation of "conditions where the oath of loyalty would not apply." A train wreck resulting in the Führer's death - that was what you would have liked best. "Then there will be no more Hitler," the British government was informed. But all of this is not really important, since even the intent to "eliminate" suffices for what I am trying to prove here.

The motives for your actions, just as for those of all your co-conspirators, were of course strictly of a pure and deeply religious kind, of the nature of a Christian sense of responsibility, and rooted exclusively in your love for your Fatherland. So in other words... what Herr Gisevius wrote about his first visit to you, in 1938, is not true? He wrote: "Suddenly this rather restrained man grew animated, not so much in terms of gestures as in verbal malice. Suddenly he was rancor in person. I have heard... many hard and angry words about our Führer in these past years; and I would not claim to have been innocent of any unpleasantness myself. But never before or since have I seen as much pent-up hatred and heard as much declamation on the subject as I was witness to in those few hours... According to him, this 'madman', this 'criminal', had deliberately set his course on war, probably out of some 'sexually pathological tendency' that made him want to see blood. 'Blood-guzzler' - that word was applied to Hitler that summer of 1938."

Or is it not true what a well-known English politician recounts, namely that you were pursuing your own personal interests and had sold your soul to the devil? Is it true that you "were embarrassed, ashamed of the plot in front of the American officer who interrogated you, because your involvement had cast a shadow over your soul as an officer"?

Come now, you mustn't be so modest; for a shadow always passes away again, but in your case things are a little different, after all. Maybe you will realize that if I show you the attitude and bearing of three other 'conspirators':


Fromm On July 20, the plotters tried to persuade General Fromm, Commander of the Reserves - in whom they imagined to have found a sympathizer - to participate in the coup. They told him that, unbeknownst to him, the fake "Valkyrie" orders which were to have effected the practical implementation of the coup had been endorsed with his forged signature and passed on. Since he had learned in the meantime that Hitler had survived, he pronounced the traitors in his presence to be under arrest. These, however, turned the tables on him and, after a brief scuffle, locked him up in his room, to release him later in the army quarters. A guard battalion freed him that evening. He then had General Olbricht, Count von Stauffenberg and other participating officers court-martialed and shot. Even so, the People's Court sentenced him to death for cowardice, and he was executed. He died with the cry of "Heil Hitler!" on his lips.


Kluge For years, the conspirators had pressed General von Kluge, Commander-in-Chief in the West, to join the plot. While he was an accessory in the sense that he knew of the plans against Hitler, he rejected the conspirators' suggestion that his army should capitulate. Due to differences in strategic matters, he was relieved of duty on August 18, 1944 by Field Marshal Model, and ordered to report to the Führer's headquarters. He took poison after writing Hitler a letter concluding with the following words:

    "There must be a way to prevent the Reich from falling victim to Bolshevism. The attitude embraced by a number of officers who were taken prisoner in the East has remained a mystery to me. My Führer, I have always admired your greatness and bearing in this titanic struggle, as well as your iron will to ensure the survival of both yourself and National-Socialism. Should fate prove stronger than your will and genius, then such is Providence, and history will bear witness to it. Act now with that greatness that is needed to put an end to a struggle which henceforward will be hopeless. In the conviction that I have done my duty to the end, I shall conclude, my Führer, to whom I was inwardly much closer than you may have guessed.
    Heil Hitler, my Führer!
    von Kluge, General"


Rommel General Rommel, Commander-in-Chief of the invasion front, was introduced to the plans of the Resistance rather late, by Karl Strölin, the former Mayor of Stuttgart. While knowing of the plans for an assassination, he did not approve. On June 17, 1944 in France, in a discussion of the military situation, he described to Hitler the poor prospects along the invasion front and the other theaters of war. Hitler dismissed his interference, and referred to the intended introduction of new weapons. Since the discussions did not achieve anything and the military situation at the invasion front did not improve, Rommel sent another situation report to Hitler on July 15, requesting him to draw the appropriate conclusions (he had deleted the word "political"), and was resolved to take up an active part in the conspiracy if his report were to be rejected again. On July 12, Rommel had been severely injured in his car by enemy fire. Hitler learned of this fact after July 20. And as much as some people refuse to understand, he chose the only solution that, though hard, was the sole correct one from the point of view of absolute state authority. Rommel, a soldier through and through, understood this and acted accordingly. He neither resisted (as it would have been thoroughly possible for him to do), nor did he prefer the option of a People's Court trial.30 Hans Hagen says it much better in issue I/4 of Nation Europa:

"It is humanly understandable that Rommel and his family and closest colleagues sympathize warmly with Hitler's enemies. But are they doing justice to Rommel's rank? Are they able to see into the soul of a soldier as great as he? The Commander took the poison that Hitler had no choice but to send him when he recognized him to be an accessory to the conspiracy and the attempted assassination. What statesman would have let an attempt on his life go unexpiated, what Commander can let a plot, carried on in the moment of greatest danger to his people, in the face of danger of fatal defeat, go unatoned-for?

"The figure of the Field Marshal rises in untainted grandeur out of the post-catastrophic clash of opinion over these events. At the tragic moment of Hitler's and Rommel's separation, it is the silent gesture with which Rommel accepts the poison that is most overwhelming. At that moment he joined the great humble ones of fate. He rises to the heights of a Socrates who, like he, took the cup of poison and, like he, scorned the advice to flee for his life. The higher level of obedience elevates Rommel beyond the conflicts of the parties, their struggles for justice and injustice as it may still apply to lower ranks and as the trend of the day may wish to portray it with randomly cast lights and shadows. We forget our quarrels of the moment in our awe of the tragic, timeless and eternal fulfilment of fate."

Now those were men, Herr Halder!


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Notes

29In his answer to points 4-6, Herr Halder makes things rather too easy for himself. The fact of the matter was rather that the civilian opposition had gone to great trouble to obtain "Document X", that is, the British declaration, because the military opposition was far too distrustful of the British attitude towards a coup; in other words, the civilian opposition requested such a document outright. That it was given was due to the fact that in the meantime the situation had become catastrophic for England, and proportionately favorable for Germany. That Herr Halder passed the document on to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, ie. his superior, was due less to his sense of duty than to the fact that the military opposition had long attempted to win Herrn v. Brauchitsch over to the ranks of the conspirators. Both of them, however, violated the loyalty and integrity of service that was required of them, by not turning the document in where it really belonged. ...back...

30Aside from its other shortcomings, the American movie about Rommel which is currently playing in theaters in Germany contains so many historical untruths that it is more than deplorable that this movie is being shown in Germany to delude the people, and is even being lauded as a document of truth etc. by business-minded movie people. This, and especially the fact that we are utterly helpless against it - due less to the bearing of other nations than to our own officials and authorities - shows how low we have sunk and how dishonorable we have become. ...back...


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Worm in the Apple
German Traitors and Other Influences That Pushed the World Into War:
The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf Hitler's Germany