Worm in the Apple German Traitors and Other Influences That Pushed the World Into War: The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf Hitler's Germany Friedrich Lenz 5. Germany's desire for a just peace Before I remark on this unbelievable behavior I must first comment on the political developments. There can be no doubt that until 1932 almost all politicians concerned with foreign affairs, and Gustav Stresemann most of all, did their utmost to free Germany from the worst of the shackles imposed by the Dictate of Versailles - but in vain, as Stresemann painfully admitted. Shortly before his death he said to the diplomat Sir Albert Bruce Lockhart: "If the Allies had met me half-way even once, I would have had the people's support. Even today I could still win their support. But the Allies left me empty-handed, and what trivial concessions they did make always came too late. So we are left with no alternative other than brute force. The future is in the hands of the young generation, and this German youth, whom we could have won for the cause of peace and reconstruction, is now lost to us. This is my tragedy and your, the Allies', crime." The only thing they succeeded in was the conclusion of a number of treaties which, it must be noted, all still had some foundation in the dictates of Versailles and which can in no way be considered to be unbiased. These are the treaties which "Hitler hastened to violate."15 Hitler now availed himself of more active methods on principle, without, however, intending for a foolish war to jeopardize his great work that was supposed "to last a thousand years". He was also very successful in this, and there could be no doubt that his success would result not only in domestic and primarily economic gains, but also in a considerable increase in international power for Germany. How serious he was in his desire for peace is shown by his continual efforts to negotiate binding disarmament agreements with Germany's former enemies. Unfortunately, every one of these efforts broke down due to the lack of good will shown by the other powers.16 In fact, the book by the French Secretary of State Georges Bonnet, Before the Catastrophe, clearly shows that there were no thoughts of disarmament, but rather the desire to catch up as quickly as possible on the arms build-up which had been neglected during Germany's weakness. The same goes for England. This was what prompted Hitler to concentrate on arms build-up - which, however, only resulted in the German arms status beginning to match that of the Western powers. He continually increased his efforts to achieve peaceful settlements with all European nations. Unfortunately, incontrovertible evidence soon made him realize that there were in fact preparations to ensure superiority over Germany in terms of national power by means of arms escalation and political isolation. It is clear that, as responsible statesman, Hitler had no choice but to at least take preventive measures against this attempt, and to arm Germany 'just in case'. Secretary of State Otto Meissner expressed this best in his book, where he wrote: "In my opinion, one will come closest to the truth by applying to [Hitler's] attitude and intentions the legal term dolus eventualis, that is, by considering that he did not desire and plan for the war, but foresaw it as a possibility and was resolved to engage in war if such were to become necessary, in the absence of other alternatives, to realize his aims." Meanwhile, the Sudetenland crisis had come about. The British government was remarkably accommodating towards Germany in this matter, and the result was the 'Munich Agreement', that solution which the broad masses of all nations lauded as a true effort towards peace by the statesmen involved, and thus as a great success on their part. Disappointed and downright enraged by Munich, on the other hand, were the conspirators of the Resistance, who believed that England had not only spared, but even strengthened Hitler by their support.17 They had to call off the coup they had planned for this time, for after such a success on Hitler's part the people would no doubt have had even less sympathy for such an act than they would have had at other times. They simply proceeded on completely false assumptions. They forgot that the British politicians, instructed and drawing on centuries of experience in planned power politics, no doubt gave due consideration in their plans to the 'power potential' offered them by the existence of a conspiracy amongst such powerful circles in the enemy camp, but were quite able and willing to bide their time until the moment was right for making use of this potential. I must go back a bit in order to make this understandable. In 1915, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the well-known author of Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, wrote in one of his wartime essays: "Everyone must give his all to the holy Cause; if they do not - if there is a chink in the armor, or if domestic discord saps the pure Germanic strength, as heretofore - then Germany is doomed." And Churchill? He knew of the 'domestic discord' and described it in his memoirs as "...the worm in the apple". He knew of its existence as early as 1938 and was perfectly clear on the consequences of this worm's activities - he had already witnessed the like before. What was it that he said on October 4, 1917 in reply to the German peace offer? "There is no doubt that the leaders of Prussian militarism are the enemies of all mankind. Therefore we must not let ourselves be tempted by a German offer, no matter how enticing it may be. After a peace victorious for Germany, Germany might say to us: 'Let us respect each other as worthy opponents, and resume trade relations.' We British must never agree to such a solution. Germany must lose all its influence in the world. Our friends inside Germany are working on the subversion of the Reich - they are waiting for a collapse." Twenty-one years later, the following statement pertaining to the visit that Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin paid to Churchill on the orders of the conspirators appeared in the Englishman Jan Colvin's book: "In Chartwell Manor Kleist lunched with Churchill's family, and he saw this great political house in days when Churchill repeatedly exposed the mistakes in the program of the Chamberlain Administration. He was received warmly but secretively, was not addressed by name, but as 'our friend', and after dinner he was taken aside for private discussions." Churchill's opinion of the real strength of the Third Reich, in light of his awareness of the 'worm in the apple', is shown by the following remark, made by the well-known British politician Robert Boothby in his book Europe and Decision: "At a luncheon with the Admiralty he said that he still believed that National-Socialist Germany was more 'brittle' than Imperial Germany had been between 1914 and 1918." In his circles, the maxim was: Hitler's enemies are our friends! So England's friends in Germany were his most powerful allies in the coming battle with Germany, and England could count on this army. But Hitler? First, let us return to Munich! Notes 15The treaty to which this charge primarily alludes is the Locarno Treaty. Now it is interesting to consider what the French Secretary of State, Bonnet, said with respect to the Locarno Treaty: "In Locarno, Great Britain and France were the absolute masters of the European game. Disarmed Germany was at their mercy. The French army could occupy Germany without a fight, in only a few days." The Treaty, accepted by the Reichstag with only a very small majority, was described by Ludendorff as "new tool of disgrace and deceit". Incidentally, the German dissociation from the Locarno Treaty was completely justified even from a strict contractual and political perspective. As late as 1932, Brüning had to protest against the attempts to force him to accept a proposal which had as its goal Germany's relinquishment of the right to the correction of the German eastern border as well as Germany's renunciation of military equality. Brüning was to have been compelled to accept this proposal by means of threatening reports that French divisions were posted at the German border. ...back... 16I will quote just one of the dozens of proofs offered for this by foreign politicians. In his book Failure of a Mission, Sir Neville Henderson wrote: "In my opinion we were not always fair towards Germany in the years from 1933 to 1938. In being unjust, however, we weakened our own cause and strengthened that of the Nazis." ...back... 17H. B. Gisevius describes the mood prevailing among his ranks when the Munich negotiations threatened to break down: "It was a load off our minds, we counted the hours until the talks broke down and we knew the Premier safely back in London." In other words, the conspirators would have preferred war, so that they could overthrow Hitler. Other publications by leading members of the Resistance also show this. ...back... Worm in the Apple German Traitors and Other Influences That Pushed the World Into War: The little-known story of the men who destroyed Adolf Hitler's Germany